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PROMISING PRIVATEERS?
Understanding the Constraints of Contemporary Private Security
at Sea
Christopher Spearin

F

or the secretary-general of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, contemporary
piracy is nothing less than a “global menace.”1 There are several piracy “hot
spots” the world over, each with its own dynamics, but it is Somali piracy that
in recent years has particularly caught the attention and raised the ire of states,
shippers, and international organizations.2 International Maritime Organization
(IMO) statistics reflect the quantitative dominance of Somali piracy. In 2010 and
2011, the number of alleged attacks in international waters off East Africa and
on the Indian Ocean (into which Somali pirates now venture) was 84 percent of
the global totals in each year. In 2012, owing to developments both on land and
at sea, the Somali weighting declined, but it was still a considerable 54 percent of
global totals.3
Largely because of the private-security efforts against Somali pirates—one
of the policy measures credited in reducing the incidence of pirate attacks—the
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piracy, has acknowledged the limits of state naval
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forces and referred to “security teams–privateers”
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as an option.7 Others have argued that privateering would be an ideal vehicle for
legal and operational coordination between public and private actors in dealing
with piracy. On some occasions these proponents specifically identify the PMSC
industry, and in others they refer to private initiative more generally.8
This article argues that usage of the word “privateer” is inappropriate for understanding what PMSCs are now doing at sea and what they might be capable of
doing. Operationally, a sufficient understanding is important because the maritime environment, especially counterpiracy work, presents growth opportunities
for PMSCs (both start-ups and firms looking to diversify following contracts in
Iraq and Afghanistan). According to some estimates, between 40 and 70 percent
of commercial shippers utilize private security to counter Somali piracy.9 This
raises a number of thought-worthy issues regarding efficacy and the management of violence. As well, appreciating how experiences on land have framed
the industry and what PMSCs can realistically offer at sea will help in perceiving
the dynamics of contemporary security governance in the maritime realm. At
the strategic level, a sufficient understanding is necessary because many of these
invocations of privateering specifically refer to the United States, a considerable
consumer of PMSC services on land. This is important, on the one hand, because
the United States is the only state with the “command of the commons,” and U.S.
Navy commanders have long been given responsibility to ensure safe passage in
sea-lanes.10 On the other hand, the relevant national policy document on piracy,
a 2007 presidential memorandum, is fairly flexible as to response options.11
This article offers four points to advance an accurate understanding of
PMSCs. First, through a historical consideration, it contends that privateering
conjures up images of vessels of capability and availability not prevalent in the
PMSC industry. While seafaring has always been an expensive endeavor, most
PMSCs today cannot incur the costs or offer the kinds of capabilities the privateers once did—because of technological changes, bifurcation between military
and commercial vessels, and cost sustainment. Second, while their rationales
changed over the centuries and their “warlikeness” was sometimes questioned,
privateers were nevertheless fundamentally on the offensive. In contrast, PMSCs
have been normatively structured to take a defensive or protective posture. Third,
the conception of contemporary privateers pursuing the public good of security
obscures both PMSCs’ pursuit of security as a private good and reasons shippers
engage them. The repercussion may be that though the United States wishes to
advance both a global maritime partnership and PMSC usage at sea, the latter
works somewhat in opposition to the former, because shippers are now “responsibilized” for their own security. The article closes with a last argument: even
if responsibilization brings to mind an earlier era of seafaring, that of “letter of
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marque” vessels, it too is not an appropriate term to understand fully the activities of PMSCs.
VESSEL CAPABILITY AND AVAILABILITY
Privateers—nonnaval ships and their crews, or private men-of-war, conducting
authorized violence at sea—were at their height from the thirteenth century to
the nineteenth century.12 Initially, a merchant aggrieved by a citizen of another
country (involving, e.g., debts, stolen goods) could apply for “letters of marque
and reprisal” from his sovereign authorizing him to seek restitution. These letters, an attempt “to bring the anarchy of retaliation under the rule of law,” indicated both the amounts sought and expiration dates.13 Though “letters of marque”
and “letters of reprisal” differed—the former were for seeking restitution within
the territory of a sovereign and the latter beyond it (for example, by capturing
flagged ships of the offending state)—the term eventually collapsed into the allembracing “letter of marque and reprisal.” Such commissions increasingly became part of public warfare; their use to pursue private reprisals was uncommon
by the mid-1700s.14 They were licenses allowing private actors using their own
resources and ships to attack merchant shipping. More generally, while expiration dates were still in place, other limits were generally removed, and privateers
could attack and capture enemy ships of whatever sort during wartime or seek
out pirates (deemed the enemy of all humankind) on a commercial basis. Arguably, this is the common perception of the privateer.
Though sovereigns did not, per se, hire privateers, they did provide regulatory
infrastructures to facilitate their voyages and payment. For instance, privateers
had to bring captured vessels into friendly ports (those that recognized the privateering license, and not those of an enemy state) for adjudication and eventual
remuneration. The rationale for these rules was fourfold: they ensured that commissions would be sought in the first instance; they punished privateers who did
not act in accordance with their commissions (if privateers mistreated captured
crews or injured neutral countries, bonds could be forfeited); they set a legal
distinction between privateers and pirates; and they permitted official “condemnation” and extraction of taxes, when applicable, before financiers or privateer
crews realized any profit from the sale of captured cargoes and vessels.15 Thus,
sovereigns developed prize courts—for instance, in France in 1373 and in England in 1426. In the late 1700s, the courts of the newly independent United States
arose from the Admiralty courts of the British colonial system. Overall, while
their efficacy was debatable, these rules did provide a measure of due process, in
terms of both how violence was employed at sea by private actors and how those
enacting violence were compensated.
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Sovereigns, and then states, developed and maintained this elaborate infrastructure also in part to obtain access, however indirect, to a special form of an
expensive technology—ships. While small vessels could become privateer ships,
the ideal privateer was larger and possessed certain characteristics.16 Such vessels
required sufficient seaworthiness for open-ocean voyages and, at times, heavy
armament to allow them to prey on transoceanic trade. They needed sufficient
speed to capture fast merchant ships or to flee from adversity (see below). They
also had to be large enough to carry sufficient manpower to dispatch prize crews
capable of taking over captured ships and bringing them into friendly ports.
Constructing, maintaining, and operating vessels of this sort would have been
a considerable expense to state treasuries already stretched by public navies. Indeed, over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Britain’s Royal Navy in itself
was possibly “the largest industrial unit . . . in the entire western world.”17 Whereas the Bank of England served as the source of credit to finance this public force,
France, for a contrasting example, lacked a similar central bank and relied even
more heavily on privateers.18 American privateers for their part considerably
outnumbered the fledgling Continental Navy during the War for Independence
and the U.S. Navy, its successor, during the War of 1812.
In terms of physical maritime capabilities, some naval analysts contend that
there were sharp distinctions between warships and privateering vessels, which
were basically converted merchant ships.19 The former, which took advantage
of technological developments in naval architecture and weaponry, were slower,
more heavily armed, and suited to a range of military tasks, especially confronting like vessels. The latter were faster and lighter in armament. One analyst offers a contemporary analogy: “In no case did [privateers] use the large ships of
the line, comparable in power projection to 20th century battleships or today’s
aircraft carriers and ballistic missile submarines.”20
Nevertheless, distinctions between state and nonstate capabilities should not
be overdrawn. During the span of centuries in which privateers operated, there
was only a slow specialization of vessels for military tasks. Privateers were not
somehow backward or second-class. As has been argued by a scholar who has
examined the record of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, privateers “were
just as ‘modern’ as their state and state-sponsored naval counterparts, in terms of
the weapons, ships, and maritime crew they used.”21 The reflections of military
historian John Keegan on “men-of-war of the wooden world” underscore the
broad commonality between naval and merchant types: “[Naval vessels] did not
differ in construction, means of propulsion or essential configuration from their
merchant sisters.”22 In fact, in some cases armed merchant ships held their own
against naval vessels. English and Dutch merchantmen in the 1600s sometimes
proved superior to Portuguese and Spanish warships, and French privateers
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/8
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during the reign of Louis XIV could be a match for the English frigates of the
day.23
Such distinctions as existed offered merchant ship owners flexibility. Both
naval vessels and merchantmen were expensive to build and maintain, but the
former had no commercial equivalence. Also, given that commerce raiding was
a wartime task, especially designated and state-owned commerce raiders would
represent a burdensome sunk cost during peacetime. As one scholar suggests,
political and financial considerations combined to make privateering ideal:
[Commerce raiding] could be carried out using physical assets . . . that had a peacetime commercial use and therefore had received healthy investment from the private
sector in the years . . . [prior to war]. Indeed, war increased the risk of commerce
and thereby made it less attractive, inclining merchants to look for alternative
24
employment.

In short, merchant vessels were relatively easy to convert for privateering; their
transaction costs were lower.25
Nineteenth-century technological and operational developments, however,
made it difficult for private actors to bridge the gap and offer other naval services. Whereas privateering had for centuries been characterized by wood,
sail, and cannon, the 1800s brought substantial advancements: power sources
(steam, combustion), propulsion systems (the paddle wheel, the screw propeller),
protective materials (iron, steel), and weaponry (gunnery, torpedoes, mines).
These changes significantly increased unit cost and generated sharper distinctions between naval and merchant classes, which in turn reduced shipowners’
transaction-cost advantages:26
When merchant vessels could be transformed easily into privateers, the privateering
system meant that in wartime a ready stock of potential privateers could be drawn
from at low cost. As military technology developed, however, substitution between
private and military use became more difficult, and the cost-saving advantages of
privateering declined. It was one thing to transform a merchant vessel into a privateer
27
and quite another to build a nuclear submarine.

With states, through their navies, now accepting the sunk costs of purchasing,
operating, and maintaining sophisticated and specialized equipment and supporting logistical systems outside of wartime, the space in which private actors
could operate was constrained.28
What is more, the demise of commerce raiding by private actors, alongside
the decline of piracy (and likewise private pirate hunters), may have itself further
segregated commercial actors. It has been argued that reductions of privateer activities in different parts of the world starting in the late 1700s allowed merchantship construction and operation to be optimized, in that armaments were no
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longer needed, nor the sizable crews that had been required to use those weapons
or to seize other vessels. This contributed to merchant productivity increases and
higher tons-per-man ratios.29
In the contemporary era, PMSCs have gone a step farther. To avoid overhead,
they mostly put guards on merchant ships rather than provide escort vessels.
Though reports have suggested that as many as forty vessels might be ready for
antipiracy work, the actual vessel-based presence in pirate-infested waters is
considerably less.30 In short, PMSCs are not platform-centric; they differ from
privateers who offered what were for their time substantial and robust vessels.
To account for this difference, one should note the often-prohibitive initial
capital outlays and the costs of redesign and refurbishment that would otherwise
be incurred, outlays that even so can achieve only constrained levels of capability.
Regarding nonmilitary vessels today, PMSCs confront the same limitations that
merchant owners did in the nineteenth century. This is implied in an observation
of the mid-1990s about contemporary maritime technologies:
Although . . . [naval technology and merchant marine technology] will have much
in common and there are varying degrees of technological overlap, as, for example,
in the manufacture and composition of naval fleet replenishment vessels, auxiliary
craft, amphibious landing ships, hydrographic ships and patrol boats, the operational
parameters and sub-systems of naval operational vessels are often radically different
31
from merchant ships.

PMSCs attempting to “bridge the delta” would face considerable expense. Certainly, they can dip into the limited pool of smaller and older state vessels, those
not already traded between navies and coast guards. However, refurbishment is
required, in part for updating, and in part because certain capabilities are likely to
have been stripped prior to sale. PMSC vessels have been taken from the former
stocks of, for instance, Scandinavian navies, the Japan Coast Guard, and the U.S.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.32 As a result, and unlike the
privateer ships of old, they have rather limited tactical and strategic mobility,
seaworthiness, and armament.
These capability limitations and the temporary nature of contract employment further limit the economic viability of PMSCs at sea. Not all shippers
confronting Somali piracy risk using PMSCs, and for those that do it is often
on a per-passage basis, for which the costs of using a special vessel are higher
than onboard personnel. PMSC vessels would also have little opportunity for
sustained state employment, because of their limited capabilities and constraints
(which will be noted below) on integrating them in larger state naval endeavors.
Indeed, analysis of state gunboat diplomacy finds that vessels that are up to date,
versatile, advanced, and threatening are at a premium. These qualities are not
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fortes of the PMSC industry currently.33 The PMSC industry generally sees in
operating its own vessels uncertain profit streams, sizable sunk costs, client-base
uncertainty, and unknown environmental prospects (e.g., a decline in piracy in a
theater would collapse opportunities there). Accordingly, it does not emphasize
vessels, either qualitatively or quantitatively, as did the privateers of old.34
OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE DIFFERENCES
Privateering, because of its underlying commercial rationale and its emphasis on
capture rather than destruction, was arguably not as “warlike” as state military
activities (though some navies awarded prize money well into the twentieth century). The financial necessity for privateers of collecting prizes placed a premium
on flexibility and independent action. As noted above, confrontations with enemy warships were not unknown, but the risk of being outgunned was evident.
The costs of a privateer ship sunk, damaged, or captured were borne solely by
the investors and (in more ways than one) its crew; they were not spread across
a state’s treasury. Moreover, even if a privateer captured an enemy warship, such
ships when condemned usually did not fetch as much money as merchantmen.
During the War of 1812, one American privateer apologized to his employer for
capturing a British naval vessel in the West Indies: “Having sought a contest with
a king’s ship, knowing that is not our object.”35
In a similar vein, blockading and merchant convoying by privateers were relatively uncommon because of the coordination required and the frequent absence
of catchable and lucrative prizes.36 In any case, these tasks were problematic for
privateers. Given that their crews did not receive wages but rather shared in the
bounty after adjudications of prize courts, their financial imperative in the face
of adversity was to flee.
What violence a privateer did commit, therefore, was usually calculated to
minimize damage so as to preserve the prize’s value. One can look at the minimization of violence in two ways. In the micro sense, this desire extended to the
point that some U.S. privateers during the War of 1812 mounted fake, wooden
cannon in hopes of simply overawing their prey. In the macro sense, if privateering arguably lowered the costs for a state to engage in warfare, the means
it employed, in a direct way, were not very destructive. Indeed, the destruction
wrought by state forces in recent centuries dwarfs the contribution of commercial
nonstate actors.37
Yet one can argue that the privateer, however “unwarlike,” was generally on
the offensive—a characterization at odds with the contemporary PMSC industry. Privateers trolled the seas looking for targets to attack; destruction at sea, or
the lack of it, was not central to intent and role. In contrast, for PMSCs, while
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weaponry is sometimes used and destruction can result, the desire is to get the
client “off the spot,” to repel an attacker. In policing terms, PMSCs, land or maritime, are not in the business of apprehending and delivering suspected pirates
for incarceration. In military doctrinal terms, PMSC activities emphasize the
defensive rather than the offensive—that is, “operations in which forces await
for the approach of the enemy before attacking” over “operations in which forces
seek out the enemy in order to attack him.”38
This is not to deny, again, that PMSCs use lethal force at sea. Indeed, once
violence begins, a PMSC may act in very robust ways, knowing the unlikeliness
of backup from public or other private forces. Neither is this to deny that such
use of force is controversial.39 Just as land-based PMSCs have been criticized for
aggressiveness in protecting vehicle convoys, PMSC violence at sea can produce
serious repercussions should a firm mistake other seafarers, such as fishermen,
for pirates.40 Concern also applies to the declaration of exclusion zones around
client ships by firms that have incurred the expense of escort vessels.41 But this is
to say that for the PMSC industry, the “offensive” and “seeking out adversaries”
are almost as pejorative as “mercenary.”
Three components inform the defensive nature of the PMSC industry. This
identification is based on recognizing that a norm is “a standard of appropriate
behavior for actors with a given identity” and thus has qualities both intersubjective (meaning shared understandings) and evaluative (meaning sense of “oughtness”).42 First, on the part of the PMSC industry itself, there is an overwhelming
focus on defensive qualities, a focus that advances self-definition and niche
capabilities. Additionally, this defensive focus places PMSCs in contradistinction
to mercenaries, which, as part of the norm-forming process, are increasingly cast
as offensive-minded actors. For one analyst, defensive activities “minimize the
effect of the charge that they are fighting (and therefore killing) in exchange for
financial gain.”43 Another provides support: “If a private security contractor were
assigned the offensive duties of a regular soldier, that fine line between contractor and mercenary would be breached.”44 Contractors on land have themselves
made similar observations: “Our job in Iraq is not to fight, it is to run. We can
only open fire to defend our clients or our own lives.”45 The formative message
offered by such industry groups as the British Association of Private Security
Companies is similar: “Any military would argue that offence is often the best
form of defense. The private security companies don’t have that luxury; they are
defensive forces.”46
Intersubjectivity also implies consideration of the viewpoints of state actors.
They similarly distinguish, for three reasons, between the offensive and the defensive, with the former acceptable only if performed by states. From one angle,
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states wish to avoid association with the pejorative word “mercenary.” The U.S.
Federal Acquisition Regulation, for instance, makes the point doubly: “Private security contractors are not mercenaries and are not authorized to engage in offensive operations.”47 From another angle, one can view the distinction as a division
of tasks, though not necessarily an exclusive one. General Peter Schoomaker, who
served as the U.S. Army Chief of Staff from 2003 to 2007, believed that PMSCs
allowed military units to conduct combat operations and “higher priority jobs.”48
Nevertheless, public forces still conduct tactically defensive tasks, such as naval
convoying, in countering Somali piracy.49 Finally, one can view the offensive/
defensive distinction as an exercise of self-definition. It helps hone and specialize
state-armed forces in terms of their functions, a process that has arguably been
under way since the end of the Cold War.50 The “value added” or unique contributions of state militaries can thereby be expressed in terms of their particular
and exclusive offensive character, and in so doing a professional distinction and
a warrior ethos are emphasized.
This stance—that only a state’s military, because of its training, character, and
authority structure, is to do certain things and have access to certain weapons—is
reinforced in a variety of academic, military, and think-tank forums. Surveys of
civilian and military officials indicate much greater acceptance of PMSCs working to protect property, personnel, or convoys than of PMSCs performing tasks
like “combat” or “fighting counterinsurgency.”51
Lastly, there is the “framing” of the PMSC industry by the international community writ large. For the founder of the International Stability Operations Association, another PMSC industry association, international endeavor cannot
be underplayed: “In the Geneva Conventions there is no difference between
offensive and defensive combat, which is pretty interesting. The way it’s sort of
come down and been sorted out by the international community is it really does
make that differentiation.”52 As a case in point, one sees the creation of Voluntary
Principles on Security and Human Rights in 2000. Endorsing states, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and corporations agree that
consistent with their function, private security should provide only preventative and
defensive services and should not engage in activities exclusively the responsibility of
state military or law enforcement authorities. Companies should designate services,
technology and equipment capable of offensive and defensive purposes as being for
53
defensive use only.

One can also look to the 2008 Montreux Document on Pertinent International
Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict—a state-based
initiative designed, first, to uphold international humanitarian law and, second,
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to offer states (and by extension other actors) good practices to consider when
utilizing PMSCs. This document similarly affirms “using force and firearms only
when necessary in self-defense or defense of third persons.”54 Building on this,
the 2010 International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers
lays down that “signatory Companies will require that their Personnel not use
firearms against persons except in self-defence or defence of others against the
imminent threat of death or serious injury, or to prevent the perpetration of a
particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life.”55 Finally, IMO guidance
for shippers places PMSC usage in the context of Best Management Practices
(BMP), which are preventative, reactive, and defensive in orientation. “Full BMP
implementation” is the first resort for shippers; the use of PMSCs is the last. The
IMO’s BMP document, like the others, states that firms “should only use firearms
against persons in self-defence or in defence of others.”56
PMSCs arguably possess great offensive potential. A related irony is that
despite their defensive posture, firms often employ and are managed by former
special-operations forces (SOF) personnel, perhaps the most offensively oriented
embodiments today of the warrior ethos. This SOF “flavor,” however, does not
translate into offensive activities but into the following:
• These personnel work well in small, self-reliant groups—an important factor,
given the aforementioned frequent lack of backup, either by private or public
forces;
• They are generally people-centric, rather than platform-centric, in their
approach;
• Their presence serves as a marketing tool as firms become linked to the heralded activities of contemporary SOF.57
Without a doubt, these distinctions between offensive and defensive and between state and nonstate actors are no small issues, given the arguments about
what PMSCs are and what they might do at sea. There is in play a significant
recasting of the roles of the public sector as traditionally understood. As has been
suggested, PMSCs diverge from “the past trend towards an ever more restrictive
understanding of what role private actors and markets should play in regulating
the use of force.”58 However, the contention here is that the private sector does
not enjoy a tabula rasa. As identities and roles shift, the expectations of states
and other international actors frame PMSC activity and impact how the firms
view themselves. Changes in identity and expectation, therefore, would have to
occur before the PMSC industry could become prominent in the application of
offensive force like the privateers of old. The context and capabilities, and the
resulting imagery, are different.
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PUBLIC GOOD, RESPONSIBILITY, AND COORDINATION
In the maritime context, the idea of pursuing security as a public good, one that
is nonexcludable and nonrivalrous, is challenging, both legally and practically.
Whereas varying degrees of sovereignty can be exercised in territorial seas and
exclusive economic zones, no state is sovereign on the oceans. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) reaffirms that the rights of
states to enjoy freedom of navigation are not to be unduly restricted, a concept
dating from the thought of Hugo Grotius in the seventeenth century. UNCLOS
also makes plain the limits on the degree to which ships flying the flag of one state
can interfere with the operations of ships flying that of another. Additionally, the
utter vastness of the oceans makes it difficult for states to exercise control for long
periods of time. This factor points to some of the difficulties the thirty or forty
warships forming the various flotillas countering Somali piracy have faced as the
pirates have become more resourceful and have traveled greater distances away
from Somalia’s shores.59
Nevertheless, one can still take the notion of contemporary pirate-hunting
privateers as an exercise in outsourcing the pursuit of security as a public good
for two reasons.60 First, because privateers would be hunting pirates who prey
on international shipping generally, all seafarers would potentially benefit from
their offensive-oriented activities.61 These modern privateers would be working to uphold freedom of navigation for all. Second, as mentioned at the outset,
the understanding of PMSCs as privateers and calls for privateering are usually
linked to the United States. To a degree, this reflects the significant interaction
between PMSCs and U.S. forces in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. It also reflects the historical reality that navies of hegemonic sea powers, going back to
the late nineteenth century, have traditionally—though not without significant
legal and operational difficulty—backstopped this freedom of navigation for
both altruistic and self-interested strategic and commercial reasons.62 The rise of
hypothetical pirate-hunting privateers, therefore, would see the transfer/sharing
of the tasks of maintaining freedom of navigation to/with commercial nonstate
actors, with states, particularly the United States, participating in terms of de jure
management and direction through letters of marque.
In contrast, PMSC engagement, as advocated by U.S. Navy voices for the international shipping industry as a whole, has focused on employment by shippers
rather than by states or on PMSC self-employment and remuneration through
an adjudicated prize system. Indeed, history suggests that only the latter could
receive the “privateer” label. Thus, for example, in 2008, when Vice Admiral Bill
Gortney was in command of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, he contended that “companies
don’t think twice about using security guards to protect their valuable facilities
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ashore. Protecting valuable ships and their crews at sea is no different.”63 Rear
Admiral McKnight (Ret.), setting up a dichotomy of either hiring PMSCs or
avoiding dangerous waters, likewise asserted that “the maritime community
must take responsibility for their vessels and ensure safe passage of their cargo
and crew through this [i.e., the Gulf of Aden] pirated region.”64 In 2010, Admiral
Mark Fitzgerald, commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe, offered this openended recommendation: “There has got to be security on these ships in my
opinion. . . . It is up to the commercial industry to figure out how to deal with
this. But I do not think that we can give them a 100 percent guarantee that we can
protect them, nor should we.”65
Though the U.S. Navy is the world’s only global navy and has a stated policy
of keeping sea-lanes open, these calls put shippers on notice, given the limited
naval capabilities of many European merchant-flag states and the fact that openregistry states generally lack naval-projection capabilities altogether. Subsequently, many states have developed authorization procedures and guidance on how
shippers should use PMSC services (e.g., financial considerations and vetting
procedures). In a similar way, the Montreux Document identifies considerations
for states and other actors, like shippers, to contemplate.
The end result is that PMSC usage is currently based on individual shippers
making security decisions. While pursuit of security as a public good is not inconceivable, at present the pursuit focuses on security as a private good—one that
is excludable and rivalrous.66
One can place this in the context of what has been called the “great risk shift,”
by which responsibility for security writ large is diffusing away from states as a
collection, or from “the state” as an institution.67 This is “responsibilization,” a
reframing of accepted conceptions such that nonstate actors are seen “as a set
of autonomous subjects both responsible for and capable of securing themselves”
rather than as objects whose security is provided by the state.68 On land, for instance, this is evident in how humanitarian and development NGOs increasingly,
if uneasily, rely on PMSCs.69 In some cases donor states even insist that NGOs
employ private security.70 At sea, utilization of PMSCs by shippers, therefore, is
an extension of these trends, with the exception that the binary divide between
state and nonstate is recast as one between a hegemonic navy and the shipper.
The concern is that responsibilization may hinder U.S. plans to develop cooperative relationships among maritime users—a collective plan to foster security
as a public good. In the maritime environment, given its vastness and the much
smaller likelihood that a merchantman in need would receive immediate naval
response, newfound independence may marginalize cooperation between state
and nonstate actors. On the one hand, the 2007 “Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower” looks beyond interstate cooperation to counter transnational
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and irregular challenges: “Increasingly, governments, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and the private sector will form partnerships of common interest to counter these emerging threats.”71 PMSCs might
value intelligence exchanges with state forces. On land, for instance, operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan eventually featured offices designed to offer situational
awareness, a common operating picture for contractors and the military, and
coordination. On the other hand, even with these structures in place in Iraq and
Afghanistan, participation was voluntary, and many PMSCs did not engage. At
sea, some shippers eschew state-provided convoying because of the unavoidable
time delays involved. As well, shippers likely decline to report instances of piracy
and pirate contact, to avoid unwanted publicity, insurance hikes, and again, delays and associated financial impacts. Finally, the commercial demands of shippers and the cumbersome and slow vessels they mostly operate dovetail with the
PMSC industry’s defensive posture; shippers are not in the pirate-apprehension
business.72 In sum, this responsibilization may lead to the increasing individualization of response rather than the fostering of collective action.
“17TH CENTURY CRIME . . . 21ST CENTURY SOLUTIONS”
If we reach back into history, can we find a phenomenon that better captures
PMSC activism today than does privateering? Indeed, in some ways, responsibilization suggests a return to earlier times. There was in the age of sail an expectation that when shippers “bore the full costs of their actions, they tended freely to
take responsibility for their lives. And thus those in the private sector provided
the goods and services that were needed.”73 During this time, shippers armed
themselves, in part because of the relative weakness of naval forces, and in part
because of the fear of predation by pirates and enemy privateers alike.
In this vein, several maritime analysts identify from the early 1600s onward a
distinction—evident first in the British case and later in the American—between
vessels termed “privateers” and others called “letters of marque.”74 A captain of
one of the latter held an actual letter of marque, authorizing him to arm his ship
for security during long voyages. A letter-of-marque vessel was primarily a cargo
carrier, not optimized as a privateer—which would have a larger (non-wageearning) crew, greater speed, and heavier armament.75 The armament of a “letter
of marque” allowed some operational flexibility; the vessel could risk running
blockades and avoid the inconvenience and expense of convoying.76
While some of these rationales are congruent with today’s considerations regarding PMSC usage, there are important differences. First, the raison d’être of
PMSCs and privateers is the threat or application of violence, whereas this was
only one among a host of elements for the letter-of-marque vessel. Second, in
today’s environment, merchant crews, backed up by seafarer unions, are generally
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unwilling to take up arms. Third—like privateers but unlike PMSCs—“letters
of marque” were substantial ships for their day. Finally, in addition to capturing
a vessel as the result of a successful defense (and thus benefiting financially), a
letter-of-marque vessel might also seek out an enemy ship and capture it as a
prize, as privateers did, should the opportunity arise. Put differently, the “letter
of marque” had an offensive character lacking among PMSCs. This terminology,
then, is no better than “privateer” for the contemporary context.
In that context, the material, regulatory, and ideational differences between
contemporary PMSCs and privateers make plain how commercial nonstate violence is presently organized and enacted in the maritime realm. One can see the
world as it arguably is, rather than as one presumes it is or would like it to be.
One can see an industry that mostly eschews the usage of platforms. The PMSC
industry is largely manpower-centric, and the few vessels it employs are limited
when compared with either the privateers of the past or warships of today. One
can see, whereas historical privateering was mostly offensive-minded, an industry that is today predominantly defensive in its orientation, given the efforts of
(self-)definition undertaken by PMSCs (desiring specifically to avoid the pejorative word “mercenary”), states, and other actors. We can see an industry that,
thanks to responsibilization, is focused largely on pursuing the private good of
security in an independent manner on the behalf of its shipper clients. In sum,
in 2009 the American secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, offered this judgment
regarding piracy: “We may be dealing with a 17th century crime, but we need to
bring 21st century solutions to bear.”77 Understanding what contemporary commercial nonstate violence looks like, rather than harkening back to an earlier age,
is similarly necessary.
Additionally, clear understanding of the nature of and constraints on the
private security industry at sea, as currently constituted, is important to assess
accurately its future implications. Indeed, there are several vexing questions for
which an appropriate mind-set, for analysts and policy makers alike, is required.
Concerns are already raised about duplication of effort, difficulties of multinational command, and limitations of intelligence sharing among state forces
working to counter Somali piracy. In what ways and to what effect can PMSCs
be injected into these considerations? PMSCs are increasingly being viewed as
security experts in their own right. To what degree will techniques they introduce that promote their own industry be detrimental to or complementary with
state initiatives? Answers to these sorts of questions are important: “While states
seek to realize their programmes by mobilizing the knowledge, capacities and
resources of others, other auspices [i.e., actors] are clearly acting in very similar
ways to realize their agendas.”78 This article, therefore, is one step in identifying
the actual components of these agendas and how they may evolve in the future.
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